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NINE JUSTICES IN SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE
Thomas I. Emerson*
T H case of Griswold v. Connecticut,' like few others in recent
times, presented the United States Supreme Court with a hope-
lessly unsupportable piece of state legislation and an unusual variety
of possible doctrinal solutions. The Court's response to this situation,
and the implications* of its choice of doctrine for the future of
individual rights in America, make an intriguing study of the judi-
cial process.
The Connecticut law, as a matter of social policy, had little or
nothing to be said for it. It was enacted in 1879 and remained as a
relic of a Comstockian philosophy which had long since ceased to
be widely held, if it ever had been. The statute was at war with all
accepted standards of medical practice. It invaded the sacred realm
of marital privacy, and for all practical purposes denied to married
couples the right of deciding whether or when to have children.
Under certain not infrequent circumstances, it imposed upon indi-
viduals the cruel choice between sexual abstinence on the one hand
and ill health, death, or deformed children on the other. Not gener-
ally enforced, indeed unenforceable in most instances, it hung like a
cloud over the medical profession. More important, its enforcement
only against birth control clinics resulted in patent discrimination
against persons who were too poor or too .uneducated to seek private
medical advice. Its basic purpose was fantastically in conflict with
the clearly perceived need to deal with the world's second most
critical problem-the population explosion. Even its staunchest
supporter, the Roman Catholic Church, was ready to concede that
the use of contraceptives by married couples involved a religious
principle rather than a public policy to be imposed on all faiths by
government sanction. Yet the legislature failed to repeal the statute.2
To the ordinary layman, Griswold v. Connecticut seemed easy.
But to the lawyer it was somewhat more difficult. The lawyer's
problem with the case was that the issues did not readily fit into
* Professor of Law, Yale University.Ed. The author wishes to point out that
he was one of the counsel for appellants in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut. This
article is written in the capacity of law professor rather than advocate, but the bias
should be noted.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. There is some evidence that, at least when the case was in its final stages before
the Supreme Court, many Connecticut legislators preferred to have the Court, rather
than themselves, make the decision to eliminate the statute.
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any existing legal pigeonhole. Actually, there were five possibilities.
The case could have been dealt with under the equal protection
clause, the first amendment, substantive due process, the right of
privacy, or, in extremis, the ninth amendment. In order to strike
down the statute under any of these doctrines, however, the Court
would be forced to enter uncharted waters. Whatever course the
Court took, its action was bound to be pregnant with possibilities
crucial to the development of the law in a vital area of American life.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
The primary equal protection issue arose out of the fact, already
mentioned, that although the Connecticut birth control law was a
dead letter as far as private physicians and individuals were con-
cerned, it was effectively enforced against birth control clinics.
Thus, in actual operation the law did not apply to the private
sector of medical practice but did restrict the public sector, thereby
discriminating against persons of low income or little education.
A subsidiary equal protection issue was that the law, in effect,
favored unmarried persons as against married couples. Contracep-
tives could be legally sold in Connecticut for prevention of disease;
faithful partners to a marriage would have no occasion to use them
for such purposes, whereas unmarried persons could legally do so.
The same factors favored persons engaging in extramarital relations.
Appellants did not rely on the equal protection argument as
such, although they did urge it upon the Court as an element of
substantive due process. At the very opening of oral argument, how-
ever, Mr. Justice Brennan raised the issue, and other Justices indi-
cated their interest in it. Similarly, Mr. Justice White, in his con-
curring opinion, although proceeding primarily on due process
grounds, stressed that "a statute with these effects bears a substantial
burden of justification when attacked under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," citing three equal protection cases.8
The problem posed is a far-reaching one. The Court has of course
employed the equal protection clause, with increasing refinements
and elaboration, in the area of race relations. The important ques-
tion is how much further the Court will go in utilizing this constitu-
tional provision to aid the economically and socially disadvantaged.
The Court is steadily moving in that direction. Already it has
insisted upon eliminating some of the effects of gross disparity in
3. 381 U.S. at 503. The equal protection cases cited, along with a due process case,
were McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 816 U.S. 585
(1942); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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income between defendants caught in the criminal process, 4 it has
invoked the equal protection clause to achieve political equality in
reapportionment cases,5 and it has relied upon the clause to protect
a business enterprise against economic grudge legislation.6 As the
war against poverty demonstrates, few issues are of more importance
to the society of the future than that of assisting its disadvantaged
members.
However, the development of equal protection along these lines
raises a host of obvious difficulties. It will not be easy to reconcile
such equal protection theories with the economic and social laissez-
faire assumptions and practices upon which our society has operated
over many years and to which it still largely adheres. These uncer-
tainties persuaded counsel for the appellants that there was little
to gain in raising bare equal protection issues, as distinct from
substantive due process issues, in this litigation. Under the circum-
stances, the Court, probably wisely, refrained from probing further.
However, the interest in the issue evidenced by some members of
the Court carries a portent for the future.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment issue was raised by appellants, but it
was relatively weak. It was quite evident that appellants had engaged
in some conduct-such as giving physical examinations and 'dispens-
ing contraceptives-which could be classified only as action rather
than speech. Their argument conceded this point, but stressed
two other factors. First, the aiding and abetting statute, under
which appellants were actually convicted, made it a crime not only
to "assist" and "abet" another person to commit an offense, but
also to "counsel" him to do so. Thus, at least in theory and possible
application, this statutory provision swept broadly into the first
amendment area. Second, in the conduct of the trial no effort had
been made to distinguish between protected areas of speech and
unprotected areas of action; everything was mixed together in one
grab bag.
The case thus involved two crucial aspects of first amendment
theory. One concerns the coverage of the first amendment-the
extent to which it protects conduct that is not strictly speech but
is essential to the exercise of free speech. The other, closely related,
is the problem of separating speech from action in a complex situa.
4. See, e.g., Griffin v. Ilinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 269 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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tion, rather than lumping them together in a way which penalizes
speech in the course of regulating action. The Court has come
more and more to recognize these problems and has begun to deal
with them.7 In view of the multiplying indirect restrictions upon
speech, these questions are bound to become key issues in our effort
to maintain a system of freedom of expression.
The birth control case, however, did not present a very favorable
opportunity for the Court to press forward on these frontiers. The
Court would have had to go beyond anything it had decided before,
and it would have had to face some hard problems in determining
how far to cut down aiding and abetting statutes and, indeed,
much legislation dealing with inchoate crimes. Although the Court
refrained from treating first amendment problems directly, first
amendment overtones were strongly heard in the prevailing opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas. It would seem clear that any state law applied
to prohibit the giving of advice on the value or methods of con-
traception would fall under the ban of the first amendment. More
important, while there is nothing in the opinions on the question
of separating speech from action, the Douglas opinion does continue
the dialogue on the issue of first amendment coverage.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS
Substantive due process issues were central to the case. Not only
was the direct argument strohgly urged, but due process considera.
tions were also involved in the right of privacy issue, to be discussed
later.
The space available here does not permit a detailed analysis of
the Connecticut law or its operation, beyond what has already
been undertaken. Suffice it to say that a factual demonstration that
the law was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and not reasonably
related to a proper legislative purpose, did not pose serious difficul-
ties. This feature of the case was the basis for lay optimism over the
outcome. The due process argument was facilitated, moreover, by
the fact that neither the Connecticut legislature nor the courts had
ever fully articulated, much less defended, the objectives of the
legislature in enacting the law. Starting from this point, however,
there were two aspects of due process which raised significant ques-
7. With respect to the coverage of the first amendment, see NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). With respect to the separation of speech and action, see Gibson v.
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). For a further discussion of these
matters, see Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Y= L.J.
1, 24- (1964).
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tions. The first was whether the Court would undertake to elaborate
a distinction between the application of substantive due process
to cases involving personal rights and its application to cases con-
cerning economic rights. The second involved the question as to what
standards of due process are to be employed in considering legisla-
tion based not on objective facts related to the public welfare, but
rather on grounds of purely moral principle.
A. Substantive Due Process and the Distinction Between
Personal and Economic Rights
In the development of substantive due process, attention has
been primarily focused upon cases where the doctrine has been in-
voked in opposition to economic or social welfare legislation. The
earlier cases, in which due process was freely employed to strike
down such legislation, are typified by Lochner v. New York.8 How-
ever, beginning in the middle thirties with Nebbia v. New York9
and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,0 the Court sharply shifted
direction, and since that time it has been virtually unwilling to
listen to the due process argument in such cases."1 At the same time,
there has been developing another line of cases in which due process
is utilized on behalf of individual or personal rights. This second
line of authority commenced with Meyer v. Nebraska,12 in which the
Court held invalid a state statute prohibiting the teaching of the
German language to pupils who had not passed the eighth grade,
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,3 in which the Court ruled uncon-
stitutional a law preventing the operation of private schools. The
Meyer and Pierce decisions, in which Mr. Justice McReynolds
wrote for the Court, did not distinguish between personal and
economic rights, and the decisions in fact leaned heavily upon the
need for protecting property rights. Nevertheless, the distinction
is implicit.
More recently, the Court has expressly employed the due process
doctrine to uphold individual rights in a variety of cases. One ex-
ample of this approach is Wieman v. Updegraff,14 in which a state
loyalty program that penalized innocent membership in a "sub-
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
10. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
11. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
12. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). -
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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versive" organization was found to be invalid. Other cases have in-
voked the doctrines of undue breadth or vagueness, which are mixed
concepts of procedural and substantive due process, to strike down
similar legislation.1 5 In Aptheker v. Secretary of State0 a federal
statute denying passports to members of the Communist Party was
held unconstitutional on the ground that it was not narrowly
drafted to meet a specific evil. Yet the Court has never fully
articulated the reasons for the difference in its approach to these
two lines of cases.
The distinction is nevertheless a fundamental one. In the Meyer-
Aptheker type of case, the legislation touches upon fundamental
individual and personal rights essential to maintaining the inde-
pendence, integrity, and private development of a citizen in a highly
organized, yet democratic society. In the Lochner-Nebbia situation,
the legislation deals with economic regulation of commercial and
property rights, essential to maintaining the public interest in con-
trolling a highly complex, industrialized society. The distinction
is thus basic in striking the balance between public interest and
private right in a modem, technologically developed nation.
The Connecticut birth control case would have been an oppor-
tune one in which to clarify due process doctrine along the lines
indicated. But the Court chose not to rest its decision on straight
due process grounds and hence never reached these issues directly.
However, there is language in the opinions which indicates that a
majority of the Court are ready to apply the distinction. Mr. Justice
Douglas stated in the prevailing opinion:
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic prob-
lems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however,
operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife
and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.'7
Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring for himself and Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, was even more explicit:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where
fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be
abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of
15. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel,
Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961);
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 864
U.S. 479 (1960).
16. 578 U.S. 500 (1964).
17. 281 U.S. at 482.
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a proper state purpose. 'Where there is a significant encroach-
ment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524. The law must be shown
"necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplish-
ment of a permissible state policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 196.18
Mr. Justice White, alone among the majority, placed his decision
squarely upon substantive due process grounds. The opinion is a
narrow one, however, taking advantage of a concession made by
counsel for Connecticut at oral argument that the sole purpose of
the law was to prevent "promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships."
Mr. Justice White did not have much trouble demolishing this
position, and hence did not find it necessary to enter into more
subtle analysis of the due process clause.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart did face the issue,
however, and explicitly repudiated any distinction between the two
types of due process cases. In fact, both Justices went farther,
arguing that substantive due process should be limited to the issue
of whether the legislation was unduly vague.19 The majority, it
is clear, did not hold either view. It can be expected, therefore, that
at some future time the distinction between personal rights and
economic rights in the application of due process doctrine will
be more fully elaborated.
B. Substantive Due Process and Its Relation
to Public Morals
The second significant aspect of substantive due process arose
out of the fact that the primary objective of the Connecticut statute,
as far as could be determined, was to promote public morality by
prohibiting the use of extrinsic devices to prevent conception, even
within the marital relation.20 The enactment was, in othei words,
designed to compel adherence to a purely moral principle. Thus, to
attack such legislation on due process grounds posed a special
problem.
When legislation is designed to promote health, safety, or the
18. Id. at 497. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Goldberg was applying first
amendment and racial-equal protection doctrine to issues of substantive due process.
19. Id. at 511-18, 520-24, 528.
20. As noted above, counsel for Connecticut apparently abandoned this position at
the oral argument, and Justices White and Goldberg relied upon this concession. Never-
theless, this seems to be the position taken by the Connecticut courts. See State v. Nelson,
126 Conn. 412, 424, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (1940).
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general welfare in a material sense, its validity under the due process
clause can be tested by considerations that can be objectively deter-
mined and rationally weighed. The questions whether the statute
is arbitrary or capricious, or has a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, turn in such cases upon factual material which
can be discovered and presented to the court and upon value judg-
ments which are subject to exposition and debate. The Brandeis
brief is, of course, a classic illustration of this approach to the due
process clause.
When the legislation is designed to promote public morality,
however, the problem of applying the standards of due process may
take a different form. In some cases, such as a statute prohibiting
prostitution, the moral purposes may be justified by reference to
objective and rational factors relevant to the promotion of the
general welfare. However, in other cases the legislature may under-
take to legislate purely on the basis of moral principles which are not
subject to objective evaluation. In such a case, how are the custom-
ary criteria of due process to be applied?
Justices Black and Stewart, as indicated above, would not attempt
to apply substantive due process standards, other than vagueness,
at all. But the other Justices repudiate this approach. Hence they
cannot take the position that the simple claim of a moral aim by the
legislature satisfies the requirement of due process. Any such a doc-
trine would immunize virtually all legislation from the mandate of
the due process clause. It would allow the legislatures to impose
restraints upon individual liberties solely on the ground that some
insignificant fraction of the community regarded the issue as a moral
one. Yet a law prohibiting women from appearing in public without
veils or forbidding women to use lipstick or cosmetics, even though
some persons in the community might regard such practices as im-
moral, would surely be held an arbitrary infringement of personal
liberty outlawed by the due process clause. What, then, should be the
constitutional standards for applying the due process clause in cases
where the legislature seeks to promote public morals?
Counsel for appellants argued that the standard in such cases
should at least be that (1) the moral practices regulated by the
statute must be objectively related to the public welfare, or (2) in
the event no such relationship can be demonstrated, the regulation
must conform to the predominant view of morality in the com-
munity. In other words, if the legislature cannot establish that the
law promotes the public welfare in a material sense, it cannot
[Vol. 64,219
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enforce the morality of a minority group upon other members of
the community. The obscenity cases were cited as supporting a some-
what similar doctrine. It was further suggested that the first standard
set forth above would be sufficient in itself, without the second.
That is, if the moral principles cannot be objectively related to the
public welfare, the legislation fails, for that reason alone, to meet
the standards of due process. However, it was pointed out that it
was not necessary to take this position in order to decide the case
then before the Court.
Mr. Justice Stewart, although not meeting this argument
squarely, apparently considered and rejected it.21 The other Justices
did not refer to it. Obviously the problem raises crucial but con-
troversial questions respecting the relation of law and morals. The
Court was not willing to venture into such a delicate area. Perhaps
one cannot blame them.
IV. NINTH AMENDMENT
The ninth amendment issue was not raised at the trial by the
appellants, and was urged in the Supreme Court only as one source
of the right of privacy. However, to the astonishment of many
observers, five of the Justices accepted the invitation to consider
the ninth amendment as a basis for invalidating the Connecticut
statute. Mr. Justice Douglas invoked it as one of the constitutional
guarantees from which the right of privacy was derived. Mr. Justice
Goldberg discussed it at length, but his opinion seems to give it
a more limited significance. He expressly repudiated the argument
that the ninth amendment "constitutes an independent source of
rights protected from infringement by either the States or the
Federal Government."'22 Rather, his position was that "the Ninth
Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that funda-
mental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included
there not be deemed exhaustive.".23 The specific rights must there-
fore still be derived from other sources.
The fact that a majority of the Supreme Court, for the first time,
relied upon the ninth amendment in any serious way to strike down
state legislation is an event of considerable importance. Yet there
remains grave doubt that the ninth amendment has a significant
future. Mr. Justice Goldberg's formulation does not seem to open
21. 381 U.S. at 530.
22. Id. at 492.
23. Ibid.
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any really new possibilities. The doctrine that the due process
clause protects certain fundamental rights not expressly mentioned
in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution is well estab-
lished, and has been utilized on many other occasions.24 Mr. Justice
Douglas' use of the ninth amendment carries a greater potential.
Under his theory, the ninth amendment might be utilized to expand
the concept of privacy or, perhaps, to guarantee other basic rights.
It would hardly be surprising, however, if this development were
some decades away.
V. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Since no constitutional "right of privacy" had previously been
recognized, at least as an independent doctrine, in order to dispose
of the case on this ground it was necessary to establish a new con-
stitutional concept. This involved three major problems. One was
to determine the source from which the new doctrine was derived,
a second was to indicate the standards by which the doctrine would
be applied, and the third was to suggest, if only tentatively, the scope
of its application.
A. The Creation of the Right
With respect to the initial problem of determining the source of
the right of privacy, there were two approaches available. The first
was to argue that, although the Constitution nowhere refers in ex-
press terms to a right of privacy, nevertheless various provisions of
the Constitution embody separate aspects of such a concept, and the
composite of these protections should be accorded the status of a
recognized constitutional right. This approach was adopted in the
prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas: "Specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance." 2 From
the first amendment, the third amendment, the fourth amendment,
the privilege against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment,
and the ninth amendment, he concluded that "the right of privacy
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one." 20
The second approach starts from the position that the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment, whether or not it incorpo-
rates some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, guarantees
24. Mr. Justice Goldberg himself cites, among other cases, Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
25. 381 U.S. at 484.
26. Id. at 485.
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such basic rights as are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
The right of privacy can be considered such a fundamental right
and hence protected under the due process clause. This view of the
matter was taken by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion.27
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his opinion joined by the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Brennan, seems to have combined both approaches.
He expressly accepted Mr. Justice Douglas' view that a right of
privacy was "protected, as being within the protected penumbra
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 28 However, he also
pointed out that "the concept of liberty protects those personal
rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms
of the Bill of Rights."29 He, too, went on to find that the right of
privacy was a fundamental right.
The precise source of the right of privacy is not as important as
the fact that six Justices found such a right to exist, and thereby estab-
lished it for the first time as an independent constitutional right.
It was a bold innovation. Yet it was not entirely without precedent.
The Court had previously recognized a somewhat similar "right of
association" derived from the various specific guarantees of freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and petition in the first amendment.8 0
In any event, the creation of a right to privacy is a step with
enormous consequences. The concept of limited government has
always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited govern-
ment. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system
of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs
to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of this private sector-pro-
tection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
-has become increasingly important as modern society has devel-
oped. All the forces of a technological age-industrialization,
urbanization, and organization-operate to narrow the area of pri-
vacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the dif-
ference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.
27. Id. at 500. Mr. Justice Harlan's views are stated at greater length in his dissent-
ing opinion at a prior stage of the litigation. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
28. 381 U.S. at 487.
29. Id. at 486.
30. See the line of cases beginning with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), collected in Emerson, supra note 7, at 6-15.
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B. Standards of Application
Having established the constitutional right of privacy, the Court
was confronted with the second problem-determination of the
standards by which the new doctrine would be applied. Mr. Justice
Douglas dealt with this question somewhat summarily. He noted
that the Connecticut law, "in forbidding the use of contraceptives
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve
its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon
[the marriage] relationship."3' He mentioned specifically the prob-
lem of actual enforcement, of allowing the police "to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives."32 He also applied the rule against undue breadth:
"Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so
often applied by this Court, that a 'governmental purpose to con-
trol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' ,3
The Goldberg opinion proceeded in a somewhat different direc-
tion. It took as its primary standard a balancing test, but one which
placed a heavy burden of justification upon the government: "[T]he
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling."34 Mr. Justice Goldberg also reiterated the Douglas
position that the law must not "sweep unnecessarily broadly," and
added that other Connecticut laws on adultery and fornication
"demonstrate that means for achieving the same basic purpose of
protecting marital fidelity are available to Connecticut without the
need to 'invade the area of protected freedoms.' "5
While the Court is thus not settled upon the exact formula by
which to determine whether the right of privacy has been infringed,
it would seem clear that the test is more severe than that applied
in substantive due process cases involving economic regulation. On
the other hand, in view of the newness of the constitutional right,
the vagueness of the concept, and the general lack of precise stand-
ards, it would appear that there is little prospect of working out
any such strict test as has been proposed for first amendment cases.
It is most likely that future decisions will follow the Goldberg ap-
31. 381 U.S. at 485.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. Mr. Justice Douglas had previously elaborated his views in Poe V. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961), where he had also stressed primarily the impact of enforcement
activities upon marital privacy.
34. 381 U.S. at 497.
35. Id. at 497-98.
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proach-a balancing of factors, with the government required to
show a "compelling interest," supplemented by doctrines of undue
breadth, vagueness, and the feasibility of alternative measures.
C. The Scope of the Right
With respect to the third problem-the scope of the right of
privacy-the Court proceeded with its customary caution when
venturing into new fields. The facts of the case before it, although
strong, embraced a relatively narrow area. They were confined to
a use statute, discriminatory in operation, which had been applied to
married couples. The Douglas opinion, to the extent it deals specifi-
cally with the scope of the right to privacy, treats only of the "mar-
riage relationship." The Goldberg opinion is also addressed to the
"right of marital privacy," although it does refer to the privacy of
"the marital home" and the right "to marry and raise a family." It is
conceivable that in future cases the Court will limit the doctrine to
the marriage relationship, or even refuse to extend it beyond the
precise facts of the Connecticut case. However, such an outcome
seems unlikely, since constitutional doctrines have a way of expand-
ing beyond the boundaries of the original case. This is especially
true where, as here, the right established is one which responds
so acutely to the growing needs of the society. It is impossible to
foretell, of course, what the future course of development may be.
But it is not hard to anticipate some of the claims that will be
pressed upon the Court in the coming years. And any appraisal
of the significance of the Court's action in the Connecticut case
demands some speculation, however brief and uncertain, concern-
ing the Court's response.
One series of issues revolves around the same aspect of the right
to privacy as that involved in Griswold-the marital relationship.
It would seem reasonably clear that other laws attempting to prohibit
certain kinds of sexual activity by married couples, such as so-called
acts of "perversion," requiring a type of enforcement similar to
that implicit in the Connecticut statute, would fall under the ban
against invasion of privacy. Less clear, however, is the fate of state
laws regulating not the use of contraceptive devices, but their man-
ufacture, sale, or distribution. Plainly, many forms of regulation-
such as those designed to safeguard health or safety, or requiring
-distribution through physicians or licensed drug stores-would be
upheld. But would an attempt by the state to enforce a total pro-
hibition of access to contraceptives by married couples, such as the
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Massachusetts statute,36 constitute an invasion of the right of marital
privacy? In this situation, the nature of the right is not coterminous
with that protected in the Griswold case. It no longer involves
those aspects of police enforcement which loomed so large under
the Connecticut statute. Rather it consists primarily in the right
to have or not have children, and to plan a family. In view of Mr.
Justice Goldberg's inclusion of the "right to marry and raise a fam-
ily" within the right of privacy, and in view of the fundamental
nature of such a right, it would not be surprising if the Court ac-
cepted such a claim.
If this supposition is accurate, then the corollary would seem
to follow that action by the government to compel limitation of
births, at least in the absence of special compelling circumstances,
would also constitute an invasion of privacy. Indeed, Mr. Justice
Goldberg stated this as an a fortiori proposition. The new doctrine
thus carries serious implications for sterilization laws and future
birth control programs. Undoubtedly the government could en-
courage birth control by many means other than strict compulsion,
but a line between encouragement and coercion would have to
be worked out. On the same view of the scope of the right to privacy,
the way would be open for an attack upon significant aspects of
the abortion laws.
An additional area in which claims to the right of privacy are
likely to be invoked embraces the multitude of existing laws relating
to sexual conduct outside the marital relation. It seems unlikely
that the Court would disturb most of the legislation relating to
adultery, fornication (commercial or otherwise), and homosexuality.
Indeed, Justices Goldberg and Harlan expressly disclaimed any
such intention. However, some of the particularly arbitrary, irra-
tional, or unenforceable aspects of such legislation might be vulner-
able. It is conceivable that sometime in the future, as mores change
and knowledge of the problem grows, all sexual activities of two
consenting adults in private will be brought within the right of
privacy.
Apart from sex laws, it would not be surprising to see the con-
cept of privacy employed in a number of other situations to safeguard
the private sector of our lives from government encroachment. One
obvious area in which this concept is sure to be pressed and may
well be successful, at least in part, is electronic eavesdropping. The
scientific possibilities are so fantastic and the invasion of privacy
36. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21 (1932).
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so devastating that it is hard to believe a civilized society will not
feel compelled to throw up some protection to individuals. This
may come about through legislation, but the constitutional right of
privacy could also play a significant role. 7
Other such areas also come to mind. Various kinds of police
practices, not technically covered by the search and seizure guaran-
tees of the fourth amendment, would easily fall within an expanding
concept of the right to privacy.8 Efforts by government officials
to compel the production of private information through legisla-
tive committees, lie-detector tests, or other similar means may grad-
ually be brought within the constitutional doctrine. Release of
official records of arrests not resulting in conviction might be cur-
tailed. Finally, the whole field of social welfare legislation and admin-
istration may be forced into procedures and practices more com-
patible with human dignity and integrity. Thus, restrictions imposed
by official or semi-official welfare agencies upon the private life or
activities of welfare recipients may well become subject to the new
guarantees of privacy.8 9
The foregoing observations are merely. indicative of some of
the areas that may be encompassed within an expanded concept of the
right to privacy. Undoubtedly the Court will proceed slowly,
developing the right to privacy on a case-by-case basis. The essential
point is that the key constitutional doctrine has been enunciated,
and many forces in our society will press hard toward fuller realiza-
tion of its great potential.
Vl. CONCLUSION
What, then, are we to conclude about the Court's performance
in the birth control case? On the whole, the Court's choice of the
privacy doctrine as the basis of its decision seems sound. Unprece-
dented as it was, and as broad and ill-defined as it remains, the
doctrine still represents the narrowest and most precise formula
available, and the one most relevant to the issues presented. This
37. See, e.g., Judge Washington's dissent in Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173,
178 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
38. It should be noted that to the extent specific activities of government officials
are held to violate the constitutional right of privacy, they may be subject to criminal
prosecution and civil redress under federal civil rights legislation. See, e.g., York v.
Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), holding that allegations that police officers took
photographs of a woman complainant in the nude and distributed them among their
fellow officers stated a cause of action under Rxv. STAT. 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964).
39. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare-The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
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creation of a new constitutional protection meets a critical need of
society, and the new doctrine seems to have a viable and significant
future.
The Court will undoubtedly be attacked upon the broader
ground that, since the objections to the Connecticut law did not
fall clearly within any established and specific legal category, the
Court should not have invalidated the law at all. Supporters of
the argument for "neutral principles" can hardly be satisfied that
the creation of a new principle conforms to their view of the Court's
function. Furthermore, the concern of Mr. Justice Black, forcefully
expressed in his dissent, that more is to be gained by strict adherence
to specific provisions of the Constitution than by excursions into the
realm of "natural law," cannot be discarded lightly. Yet it is signifi-
cant that Mr. Justice Harlan, the most ardent advocate of judicial
self-restraint now on the Court, joined in the establishment of the
new constitutional right to privacy. This indicates that, in the
context of the case before it, the claim to constitutional protection
presented could not readily be thrust aside. In any event, the role of
the Court as guardian of individual rights has been both solidified
and advanced.
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